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Since its creation in 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has promulgated an array of "command and control" regulations that
specify the methods and technologies firms must use to control pollution.
Recognizing that this regulatory approach is often unduly expensive, EPA
began in 1974 to experiment with alternatives that allow firms greater
flexibility in meeting, national air quality goals. Since then, the Agency
has developed and implemented an ambitious policy-emissions
trading-that allows firms to trade rights to emit air pollutants.' Accord-
ing to EPA administrator Lee Thomas, emissions trading has become
"one of EPA's most impressive accomplishments." '
In spite of the potential importance of emissions trading as an alterna-
tive to conventional regulatory approaches, surprisingly little effort has
been spent evaluating the impact of this program. This Article is the first
attempt to provide a systematic analysis of the different elements that con-
stitute emissions trading. Our analysis shows that the bulk of emissions
trading has taken place in activities different from those predicted by re-
searchers and regulatory analysts.
This Article begins with a review of past research concerning the use of
market systems to regulate activities that adversely affect the environment.
Part II summarizes the legislative and regulatory underpinnings of emis-
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1. Emissions trading consists of four different activities: emissions offsets [hereinafter offsets], bub-
bles, banking of emission reduction credits [hereinafter banking], and netting. Emission Trading Pol-
icy Statement, General Principles for Creation, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits,
Final Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,830 (1986) [hereinafter Final Trading Policy]. See infra notes
59-77 and accompanying text (discussion of offsets); see infra notes 78-105 and accompanying text
(discussion of bubbles); see infra notes 106-24 and accompanying text (discussion of banking); see
infra notes 125-44 and accompanying text (discussion of netting).
2. Memorandum from Lee M. Thomas, EPA Administrator (May 19, 1986) (discussing major
bubble issues and EPA's Final Emissions Trading Policy) (on file with authors).
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sions trading and the four major activities allowed under the program.
Part III examines the performance of these activities and demonstrates
that although the economic gains from the program have been substantial,
they have fallen far short of their potential. This examination also sug-
gests that environmental quality appears to be largely unaffected by the
use of emissions trading.
The presentation of data on the performance of emissions trading,
although important, does not in itself provide a basis for understanding
the reasons for that performance. Part IV describes how the structure of
the federal and state regulatory systems limits the ability of firms to use
emissions trading effectively. Part V evaluates several proposals to reform
emissions trading, including EPA's "final" emissions trading policy. This
Article concludes with an assessment of the potential scope for regulatory
reform in light of regulatory and political constraints.
I. The Design and Potential of Market-Based Pollution Control
Programs
For many years, economists and lawyers have argued that the command
and control approach to environmental regulation is inefficient and that
other approaches can, in principle, achieve any desired level of environ-
mental quality at a lower cost.' To support this argument, economists
have conducted numerous theoretical studies and created a number of sim-
ulation models that compare existing regulatory approaches with market-
based systems." The simulation models reveal that a more judicious design
of regulatory approaches for emissions control could result in savings
amounting to billions of dollars. This potential for savings motivates the
development of marketable permit systems such as emissions trading.'
Initial theoretical research focused on the design of efficient markets to
control externalities." This research demonstrated that by creating markets
3. See, e.g., A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975); Ack-
erman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1333-65 (1985).
4. For a detailed review of these studies, see Hahn, Literature Review For Tradable Permits in
IMPLEMENTING TRADABLE EMISSIONS PERMITS FOR SULFUR OXIDES EMISSIONS: A CASE STUDY IN
THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN (California Institute of Technology ARB Contract No. A8-141-32,
1982).
5. Three basic steps are necessary to design a market system to limit pollution: (1) define the
commodity that is being traded, such as permits to emit pollutants; (2) distribute the permits; and (3)
design rules for trading them. The government can control the aggregate level of emissions by fixing
the overall number of permits, and suitable trading rules can give firms flexibility to meet their objec-
tives in a manner consistent with broader societal environmental objectives. For a detailed discussion
of some of the basic issues involved in implementing market systems, see Hahn, Marketable Permits:
What's All the Fuss About?, 2 J. PUB. POL'V 395, 395-411 (1982).
6. J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1972); Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and
Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 395, 395-418. For a comprehensive
review of the theory, see W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
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in pollution rights, the government could achieve any specific level of envi-
ronmental quality at the lowest possible aggregate cost. Recent research,
however, has questioned some of the critical assumptions underlying these
results. One of these assumptions is that firms are price-takers in a com-
petitive permit market. Hahn provides a formal analysis of this issue and
shows how the efficiency of the market can be affected by simple changes
in the allocation of permits to firms.7 A second assumption is that maxi-
mum efficiency is obtained through the development of several markets.
Because organizing a large number of markets may be impractical, exam-
ining this assumption is important.' A third assumption relates to moni-
toring and enforcement problems that are not explicitly addressed in the
early analyses. More recent studies indicate that these issues play a criti-
cal role in the efficient design of regulatory approaches for addressing
environmental problems.'
In a survey of studies estimating the potential cost savings available
from a tradable permit system, Tietenberg reviewed the short-run cost
savings available in moving from a command and control system to a mar-
ket system.'" In several cases, the command and control system costs more
than twice the theoretical ideal to achieve a prescribed environmental tar-
get. Given that EPA projects that total air emissions control costs in the
United States will exceed $175 billion for the period 1981 to 1990, the
potential cost savings from implementing a system of tradable emission
permits are very large." Tietenberg noted, however, that these studies
typically assumed that none of the capital equipment necessary for emis-
sions control is yet in place when, in fact, emissions trading was intro-
duced after sizable capital expenditures for control equipment had already
been made.' 2 Nevertheless, emissions trading could, in our opinion, save
billions of dollars annually.'
(1975).
7. Hahn, Market Power and Transferable Property Rights, 99 Q.J. ECON. 753, 753-65 (1984).
8. See, e.g., Hahn, Trade-offs in Designing Markets with Multiple Objectives, 13 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 1, 1-12 (1986); Atkinson & Tietenberg, The Empirical Properties of Two Classes
of Designs for Transferable Discharge Permit Markets, 9 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 101, 101-12
(1982).
9. See, e.g., R. HAHN, MONITORING AND THE CHOICE OF INSTRUMENTS (Working Paper, Car-
negie Mellon University, School of Urban and Public Affairs 1982); Linder & McBride, Enforcement
Costs and Regulatory Reform: The Agency and Firm Response, 11 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 327,
327-46 (1984).
10. T. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY
42-43 (1985).
11. See ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FINAL REPORT: THE COST OF CLEAN AIR AND WATER
12 (Report to Cong. 1984) (cost estimate reported is for stationary sources of emissions only).
12. T. TIETENBERG, supra note 10, at 48-49.
13. See infra notes 98-100, 132-40 and accompanying text (analysis of potential savings from
emissions trading).
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Research directly addressing the implementation of emissions trading is
in its infancy. Hahn and Noll addressed some of the key factors to con-
sider when determining whether a competitive market in emission permits
can be established; however, as they note, the system they propose consti-
tutes a more radical institutional change than the existing emissions trad-
ing policy."' Ackerman and Stewart also propose a fundamental restruc-
turing of emissions control regulations; they advocate incorporating
auctions to distribute emission permits and abandoning the strategy of set-
ting uniform air quality standards. 15 While these proposals are innovative,
we believe their wholesale adoption is unlikely to occur in the near
future. 6
Few studies have attempted to quantify the actual performance of emis-
sions trading, partly because of a lack of available data.1 7 An early analy-
sis by Vivian and Hall 8 attempted to study markets in offsets, 9 but they
found that too few offsets had been traded between firms to conclude that
any market in fact existed. Rehbinder and Sprenger provided a detailed
description of the emissions trading policy and summarized the informa-
tion on program performance that had been gathered by EPA through
1982.0 However, they did not address the program's theoretical under-
pinnings and did not make a comprehensive evaluation of its success due
to a lack of performance data.
Early statements about program performance were generally written by
people inside the Agency who were directly involved in the program. The
general theme emerging from this literature is that the emissions trading
policy is an exciting regulatory reform with great potential."' In the only
14. Hahn & Noll, Designing a Market for Tradable Emissions Permits, in REFORM OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL REGULATION 119-46 (W. Magat ed. 1982).
15. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 3, at 1351-65.
16. See infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text (discussion why amendment to existing emis-
sions trading program unlikely).
17. As a consequence of a division of responsibilities between EPA and the states, no single entity
has taken the initiative to collect data on the performance of emissions trading activity. EPA has
collected data on the "bubbles" it has approved, but information on emissions trading activities that
are controlled primarily at the state level is contained in thousands of individual permit files. This is
significant because most emissions trading activity has occurred in programs over which the states
have primary jurisdiction.
18. W. Vivian & W. Hall, An Examination of U.S. Market Trading in Air Pollution Offsets
(1981) (Univ. of Mich., Inst. of Pub. Pol'y Stud.) (on file with authors).
19. See infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text (discussion of offset program).
20. Envtl. Protection Agency, Office of Policy Analysis, The Emissions Trading Policy in the
United States of America: An Evaluation of its Advantages and Disadvantages and Analysis of its
Applicability in the Federal Republic of Germany (1984) (on file with authors).
21. John Palmisano, Emissions Trading Reforms: Successes and Failures (paper presented at Air
Pollution Control Ass'n Ann. Meeting, 1985) (on file with authors); John Palmisano, An Evaluation
of Emissions Trading (paper presented at Air Pollution Control Ass'n Ann. Meeting, 1983) (on file
with authors); John Palmisano, Have Programs for Trading Emission Reduction Credits Failed or
Succeeded? (paper presented at Air Pollution Control Ass'n Ann. Meeting, 1982) (on file with
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previous comprehensive analysis of the emissions trading policy, Liroff
described emissions trading and its evolution and provided information on
some of the early activities under the policy.22 In a later book, he analyzed
the implementation of bubbles and described other aspects of emissions
trading.23 This study focused primarily on environmental quality issues,
although it did describe some of the cost savings resulting from bubble
use. It concluded that emissions trading had little impact on environmen-
tal quality, but that emissions trading regulations should be more restric-
tive to lessen the potential for abuse in the future.24
Several important conclusions emerge from a review of this literature.
First, the use of marketable permits appears, at least in theory, to promote
more cost-effective regulation of air pollutants than do command and con-
trol regulations. Second, the potential cost savings from the adoption of a
pure system of marketable air emission permits are quite large. Third, the
theoretical systems advocated by economists differ in important ways from
the existing emissions trading policy. While studies of the implementation
of emissions trading have often acknowledged these differences, they have
never been analyzed in detail. Thus, only an incomplete picture of the
actual performance of the emissions trading policy exists.
II. Clean Air Act Regulations and Emissions Trading
EPA's emissions trading program extends, rather than replaces, the sys-
tem for regulating emissions of air pollutants established under the
authority of the Clean Air Act.25 Emissions trading allows the exchange
of emission rights both externally (between firms) and internally (within a
single firm). The commodities exchanged in emissions trading are emis-
sion reduction credits (ERCs),26 which are property rights to emit air pol-
lutants.27 A firm creates ERCs by reducing its emissions of a specific pol-
lutant below the baseline level2" allowed by its permit, thereby creating
authors). See also Levin, Getting There: Implementing the "Bubble Policy", in SOCIAL REGULATION:
STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 59-62 (1982); Drayton, Getting Smarter About Regulation, 59 HARV.
Bus. REV. 38 (1981).
22. R. LIROFF, AIR POLLUTION OFFSETS: TRADING, SELLING, AND BANKING (1980).
23. R. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOIL AND TROUBLE OF EPA's
BUBBLE (1986). See infra notes 78-105 and accompanying text (discussion of bubbles).
24. R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at 135-44.
25. Air Quality Acts of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7626 (1982)). For a thorough accounting of the evolution of emissions trading, see R.
LIROFF, supra note 23, at 21-31.
26. An emission reduction credit is the unit of currency in emissions trading. Credits are denomi-
nated in tons per year of specified pollutants. Firms can earn these credits by controlling pollution at a
specific source beyond the level required by regulation. The credits are used in bubbles, offsets, and
netting. Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,831 (1986).
27. Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1059, 1068-69 (1981).
28. The "baseline" level of emissions refers to the level of emissions from which ERCs are calcu-
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surplus reductions. EPA regulations specify that these reductions must be
surplus, enforceable, permanent, and quantifiable in order to qualify as
ERCs.
29
A. Regulation of Air Pollutant Emissions
An understanding of the system for regulating air emissions is a prereq-
uisite for understanding emissions trading. Those elements of the system
that affect emissions trading are described in this section.30 The Clean Air
Act assigns responsibility for setting air quality standards to EPA"' and
responsibility for their implementation to the states.3 2 EPA has established
two types of standards: ambient and emission. Ambient standards set
maximum allowable concentrations for selected air pollutants.3 3 Responsi-
bility for meeting these standards rests primarily with those states located
within each air quality control region.3 4 The country is divided into 247
air quality control regions;" those that exceeded ambient air quality stan-
dards when they were formed are called "attainment areas,"3 6 and those
that did not are called "nonattainment areas."3 "
To ensure that each region meets its ambient standards, states must
develop State Implementation Plans (SIPs), which in turn must be
approved by EPA." SIPs are blueprints that detail how states plan to
meet or maintain ambient air quality standards by showing which sources
of pollution will be regulated, how they will be regulated, and how pro-
posed regulations will affect emissions and air quality.
Emission standards state the amount of a given pollutant that a particu-
lated. R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at xix. Baseline levels differ across states and among emissions
trading transactions.
29. Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,831 (1986).
30. For a more complete description of the regulatory implementation of emissions trading and its
evolution, see R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at 19-34.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1)(A) (1982).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (1982).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(I)(A) (1982). Seven types of pollutants can be involved in emissions
trading: particulates, sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxides, ozone, lead, and hydrocar-
bons. D. CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS 4-5 (1981). One important class
of pollutants that is emitted directly by sources and is involved in the creation of ozone is called
"volatile organic compounds." Thus, it is emissions of volatile organic compounds that are subject to
emission standards and are "traded," but ozone levels that are subject to ambient standards. This
distinction will usually be ignored here, and we refer only to volatile organic compounds.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (1982).
35. R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at 21.
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (1982).
37, 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2) (1982). In nonattainment areas where ambient standards have not been
met, the Act requires states to submit revised implementation plans that assure "reasonable further
progress" towards compliance. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501(1)-(2), 7502(b)(3) (1982).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982). See also 40 C.F.R §§ 52.20-.2632 (1987) (describing each state
implementation plan).
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lar type of source may emit." In general, emission standards for existing
sources are less stringent than those for new sources, and those for sources
in attainment areas are less stringent than those for sources in nonattain-
ment areas.4 States implement EPA's emission standards through permit
systems described in the SIPs. Sources are categorized either as "major
sources," which always require permits or as "minor sources," whose per-
mit requirements vary by state. 4' Permits specify emission limits set in
accordance with EPA standards."2
States have encountered two significant problems in their attempts to
satisfy EPA standards established under the Clean Air Act. First, most
states did not have sufficient time or resources to acquire the information
necessary to design successful implementation plans.' 3 In particular, emis-
sion inventories were either incomplete or inaccurate in many states."'
Second, in many cases, the emission limits set in individual source permits
were not sufficiently stringent to enable states to attain ambient air qual-
ity standards. For example, numerous regions have yet to achieve attain-
ment for ozone.'
39. R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at xx.
40. New sources include modifications of existing sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(C)(2) (1982).
For an additional description of the emission standards that apply to different classes of sources, see
infra note 132.
41. EPA regulations specify that a source must be considered major for a pollutant if it emits
more than 250 tons per year of the pollutant or, in the case of a source that falls into one of 27
industrial categories identified by EPA as important sources of air pollution, if it emits more than 100
tons per year. 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(iv)(A)(1) (1987). Sources that produce emissions below these
thresholds are designated as minor sources. However, states are allowed to set lower thresholds for
distinguishing major and minor sources, and many have done so. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1982).
42. EPA standards are binding on the states in the sense that they set maximum allowable
amounts of pollutants from specified types of sources. States can always set limits more stringent than
EPA standards if they wish to do so. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1982).
43. R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at 21-22.
44. While no study focuses on the quality of states' emission inventories, several note significant
deficiencies in those inventories. See, e.g., Roberts & Farrell, The Political Economy oflmplementa-
tion: The Clean Air Act and Stationary Sources in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION
156-57 (A. Friedlander ed. 1978); NAT'L COMM'N ON AIR QUALITY, To BREATHE CLEAN AIR 3.2-
17 to 3.2-21 (1981) [hereinafter NAT'L COMM'N]; DAMES & MOORE, AN INVESTIGATION OF PRE-
VENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION (PSD) AND EMISSION OFFSET PERMITTING PROCESSES,
4-62 to 4-70 (1980) [hereinafter DAMES & MOORE] (prepared for Nat'l Comm'n on Air Quality)
(discussion of inconsistencies between assumptions about operating conditions used in compiling emis-
sion inventories and actual operating conditions); S. CONNOLLY, H. SCHWARTZ, E. SHAPIRO & G.
VOGEL, EMISSIONS TRADING IN SELECTED EPA REGIONS 11-17, 29 (Jellinek, Schwartz, Connolly
& Freshman, Inc. Report, 1984) [hereinafter S. CONNOLLY] (EPA-commissioned study of emissions
trading noting difficulties in calculating emissions from individual sources and criticizing quality of
information included in emission inventories); R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at 10-11; Levin, supra note
21, at 65.
45. Clean Air Standards: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1987) (testimony of Lee M. Thomas,
EPA Administrator).
Yale Journal on Regulation
B. Baselines and Property Rights in Emissions Trading
The fact that established permit limits have often not enabled states to
meet air quality goals has been a major source of the controversy sur-
rounding emissions trading. Opponents of emissions trading argue that, as
long as further reductions in emissions are needed to improve air quality,
surplus rights should not be traded.4 6 Its proponents argue that the eco-
nomic gains available through emissions trading should not be sacrificed
because of the inadequacies of the permit system.' 7 This controversy has
led to uncertainty about the nature and value of a firm's property rights.
Consequently, it has had a significant effect on the use of emissions trad-
ing as a means for firms to increase the cost-effectiveness of air pollution
control.
Calculating the amount of surplus emission reductions that a firm is
entitled to use in emissions trading is, in theory, simply a matter of com-
paring the applicable baseline quantity 4' of emissions to the firm's actual
emissions. Yet, in practice, this is often a difficult task due either to ambi-
guity about the baseline or to lack of data on emissions or both. Most
states use the amount of emissions allowed in a firm's permits as the base-
line."'9 However, at least twenty states employ baselines that either explic-
itly consider a firm's actual historical emissions or vary according to the
emissions trading activity the firm uses. 50 Baselines that consider historical
emissions can also be ambiguous to the extent that a firm is uncertain
about how regulators will calculate historical emissions.
Even if the baseline for determining a firm's surplus reductions is clear,
determining a firm's current level of emissions might not be. Current
emission levels are typically calculated rather than measured directly. 1
Because these calculations are subject to the approval of regulators who
must approve an emissions trade, a firm is often unable to know how a
regulator will calculate its actual emissions.52
When baselines and reductions from baselines are ambiguous or diffi-
cult to calculate, firms are uncertain about the amount of surplus reduc-
46. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
47. R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at 9-13.
48. See supra note 28.
49. Envtl. Law Inst., Collection of State Emissions Trading Rules (1984) [hereinafter ELI] (on
file with authors). 22 states use baseline emissions as allowable emissions, 8 states use the lower of
allowable or actual emissions, 8 states use variable baselines (for example, different baselines for
offsets and bubbles), 4 states use actual emissions, and no information was given for 8 states.
50. Id.
51. DAMES & MOORE, supra note 44, at 4-48, 4-53, 4-59, 4-70.
52. For examples of the difficulties encountered by firms attempting to calculate amounts of sur-
plus reductions, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A MARKET APPROACH TO AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL COULD REDUCE COMPLIANCE COSTS WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING CLEAN AIR GOALS 59,
88-89 (1982) [hereinafter GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE].
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tions to which they are entitled. Obtaining the information necessary to
resolve this uncertainty involves costs, and a firm may perceive that there
is an additional cost in drawing the attention of regulators to its pollution-
control activities. Thus, the lack of clearly quantified property rights cre-
ates a disincentive for firms to create surplus emissions reductions and to
participate in emissions trading.
Even if a firm's property rights in surplus emission reductions can be
calculated accurately at any given time, the potential for regulatory
change can create uncertainty regarding the quantity of reductions that
can be used for future emissions trades. New emissions control require-
ments that lower the amount of a firm's allowable emissions may be
imposed. Reductions that were once surplus would then be required,
thereby effectively confiscating the property right held by the firm." Un-
certainty about the durability of these property rights creates an addi-
tional disincentive for firms to engage in emissions trading.
In addition to being a source of uncertainty, the inadequacy of state
regulators' baseline calculations is a source of controversy in emissions
trading. Many state emission inventories are based on unrealistically high
calculations of emission sources, so that the allowable emission rates speci-
fied for sources significantly exceed actual rates.54 As a result, a firm
might receive credit for surplus emission reductions without reducing
actual emissions. Opponents of emissions trading have strongly criticized
this aspect of emissions trading, which they argue creates only paper cred-
its.55 However, it is important to note that the use of paper credits is not a
problem created by emissions trading per se, but rather by poor state
implementation of the Clean Air Act. If emission inventories were sub-
stantially improved to reflect actual emissions, the problem of paper cred-
its could be eliminated.
Another basis of criticism of emissions trading is the use of surplus
reductions created when firms shut down sources, rather than through the
application of emissions control technologies. Environmentalists have
argued that the use of "shutdown credits" should not be allowed, espe-
cially in nonattainment areas, because their use in bubbles allows firms to
53. A 1980 EPA publication stated that:
[A/n ERC cannot be an absolute property right. If a community falls behind in its efforts [to
achieve air quality standards] . . . it must have the option of modifying its use of ERCs. In
developing banking rules, states must articulate the options they may use to correct this poten-
tial problem such as discounting a firm's ERCs based on the average reduction required or
establishing a moratorium on the use or creation of ERCs.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EMISSIONS REDUCTION BANKING AND TRADING UPDATE 2 (Oct.
1980) (emphasis in original).
54. DAMES & MOORE, supra note 44, at 4-48, 4-53, 4-59, 4-70.
55. R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at 12, 15.
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avoid their obligations to install emissions control equipment.5" Yet, if
state emission inventories were accurate, air quality goals should be met
through reductions required in SIPs, and emission reductions from shut-
downs could be used in emissions trading without compromising environ-
mental quality goals. Thus, the problem with shutdown credits, as with
paper credits, is not inherent in emissions trading, but is a result of state
implementation of the Clean Air Act. However, at present, the contro-
versy over the use of these shutdown credits is a disincentive for firms that
might otherwise have used these credits to engage in emissions trading.
Ironically, this may have an adverse effect on environmental quality to the
extent that it induces firms to continue to operate older plants with less
efficient emissions control equipment rather than replace them with new
plants that feature newer, more efficient equipment for controlling
emissions.
57
III. The Performance of Emissions Trading
Although not all the detailed information on cost savings and environ-
mental quality impacts that would be useful is available, 58 the analysis
presented in this Part contributes to the understanding of the performance
of emissions trading. Specifically, the data compiled below provide esti-
mates of the relative frequency with which firms use the various emissions
trading activities. The data have also enabled us to identify certain charac-
teristics of firms using emissions trading, some of the incentives (and dis-
incentives) that exist for firms to trade ERCs, and the markets in which
emissions trading takes place.
Emissions trading involves four different activities that firms may util-
ize: offsets, bubbles, banking, and netting. These activities are introduced
below and discussed at length in the sections that follow.
" Offsets are used when a major new emission source seeks to locate in a
nonattainment area. The new emissions may be offset with emission
reductions of an equal or greater amount. The required credits may be
obtained through internal or external trades.
* A bubble enables a firm to treat an existing plant with multiple emis-
sion sources as if it were a single source. Derived from the concept of a
bubble enclosing an entire facility with emissions escaping through a
single opening, a bubble allows a firm to adjust the mix of controls on
56. Id. at 16.
57. Id. at 89-91.
58. See supra note 17.
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individual sources to meet the total emission limit for the facility in a
more cost-effective manner.
" Banking enables a firm to hold ERCs as assets for future use or sale.
Each state regulatory agency must develop its own administrative proce-
dures in order to have a banking program. Details of these programs
differ significantly across states.
" By using netting, a firm seeking to increase emissions at one source in a
plant can avoid classification as a major source by reducing emissions
elsewhere within its facility. The reduction in emissions must be enough
so that the net increase in emissions is below the level at which a new
source would be considered a major source. Since the reduction used for
netting need not be as great as the emissions increase that will be caused
by the modification, a netting transaction can result in a small increase
in emission levels.
A. Offsets
EPA's offset program permits the construction of major new emission
sources in nonattainment areas by allowing firms to offset emissions
increases from these sources with decreases in the same type of emissions
from these new sources.59 If the offset program had not been established,
many nonattainment areas would have faced a ban on construction of
major and modified emission sources beginning in 1979.60 Offsets are a
unique element of emissions trading because they are mandatory for major
new sources in nonattainment areas.61
Despite EPA's lack of comprehensive data on offset transactions, which
are regulated by the states, the Agency's data can be used to estimate
offset activity. Approximately 1500 sources used offsets between 1977 and
1980, while approximately 500 sources used offsets between 1981 and
1986.62 The proportion of these offset transactions that involve internal
59. The emissions decrease must be more than equivalent to the increase to assure there will be
progress towards achievement of the air quality standards. Emission Offset Interpretive Ruling, 44
Fed. Reg. 3274, 3274-76 (1979) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51).
60. Subsequent amendments to the Clean Air Act extended the deadlines for achieving attainment
to 1982 and, for some pollutants, to 1987. EPA is not required to impose construction bans in areas
not reaching attainment until after the expiration of these deadlines. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(I)
(1982).
61. An exception to this occurs when a SIP provides for emission reductions greater than those
necessary to meet ambient air quality standards. In these cases, the state may allow new emission
sources in an area without requiring offsets.
62. The estimate for 1977 through 1980 is based on the assumption that about the same number
of major source permits have been issued since 1977 in nonattainment areas as in areas that have
never been classified nonattainment. This is a conservative assumption given the fact that nearly all
industrial centers are in nonattainment areas. The latter areas are called "Prevention of Significant
Deterioration" (PSD) areas. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ANALYSIS OF NEW SOURCE REVIEW
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and external trades is not clear. However, a 1981 study commissioned by
the National Commission on Air Quality found a "pattern of offsets
derived from company-owned sources."6 External trades apparently
account for only a small proportion of offsets.64
Although in many areas offsets have had limited use, a significant num-
ber of external offset transactions have occurred in the South Coast Air
Quality Management District (SCAQMD), which is located within the
Los Angeles basin area. Three factors explain the higher number of offset
transactions in this area."' First, firms have had to obtain offsets in order
to accommodate the strong industrial growth the area experienced over the
last decade. 6 Second, difficulties in meeting air quality goals in the area
led regulators to set the threshold level at which new sources are classified
as major far below the minimum specified by EPA.67 Third, regulators
have set standards for existing sources at stringent levels, making it diffi-
cult for firms to use netting in place of offsets.6 8
(NSR) PERMITTING EXPERIENCE I (Aug. 1982) [hereinafter PERMITTING EXPERIENCE]. 1100 major
source permits were issued, most frequently in PSD areas or in combination PSD/nonattainment
areas, during the period from 1978 through 1980. Because EPA did not establish its offset policy until
December 1976, it is reasonable to assume that no offsets were used in 1976. Air Quality Standards,
Interpretive Ruling, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51); Review of New
Sources and Modifications: Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, Require-
ments, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,558 (1976) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51) (proposed Dec. 15, 1976). If
offset activity were at a similar level in 1977 as in the period from 1978 to 1980, then about 400 offset
transactions would have occurred that year. This makes a total of 1500 in the first 4 years of the
program. The estimate that 500 sources have used offsets between 1981 and 1986 is based on data
from nonattainment areas. A regulatory change in 1980 sharply reduced the number of sources con-
sidered major for permitting purposes. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of
Implementation Plans, Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676,
52,693-98 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 124). In 1984, only 57 major new sources
or modifications received permits in nonattainment areas. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL
AIR AUDIT SYSTEM GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 1985 (Office of Air Quality Planning
and Standards No. EPA-450/2-84-008, 1985) [hereinafter 1984 NATIONAL AIR AUDIT DATA] (on
file with the authors). Assuming that about 80 offset transactions per year occurred after 1980, there
would have been approximately 500 transactions from 1981 through 1986, resulting in a total of 2000
transactions.
63. DAMES & MOORE, supra note 44, at 4-72. Interview with John Palmisano, President,
AER*X Corp. (July 8, 1986); Interview with Leslie Ritts, Former Staff Member, Environmental
Law Institute (July 10, 1986) [hereinafter Ritts interview]; Interview with Barry Elman, Staff Mem-
ber, EPA Regulatory Reform Staff (July 13, 1986).
64. Interview with John Palmisano, President, AER*X Corp. (Dec. 10, 1985) [hereinafter
Palmisano interview].
65. The SCAQMD is a local regulatory agency. Several similar local agencies exist across the
country, and our references to state regulatory agencies should be construed to include this type of
agency.
66. The SCAQMD is a nonattainment area because it failed to meet EPA ambient air quality
standards. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussion of why firms in nonattainment
areas must use offsets).
67. The emission level at which a source is classified as major is only 20 tons per year, compared
to 100 or 250 tons in the EPA standard. 1984 NATIONAL AIR AUDIT DATA, supra note 62.
68. Palmisano interview, supra note 64. See infra notes 128-41 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of why firms would desire to use netting rather than offsets).
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Table 1 presents a history of external trades for volatile organic com-
pound offsets in the SCAQMD from 198369 to 1985.
Table 170
External Offset Transactions For VOC
South Coast Air Quality Management District, 1983-1985
Number Mean Size Mean Price
of In Tons Price Range
Year Trades Per Year Per Ton Per Ton
1983 3 16 NA NA
1984 5 27 NA NA
1985 42 51 $2500 $850 to $3250
NA - Not Available
Table 2 presents information on external trades in 1985 for all
pollutants."1
Table 272
External Offset Transactions For All Pollutants
























<0.5 $5000 $2000 to 5500





<1.0 $2500 $850 to 3250
1985 as estimated by a knowledgeable offset
broker.
**Price range for actual offset external transactions which took place during 1985.
69. 1983 is the first year for which such information is available.
70. AER*X Corp. (1986) (unpublished report).
71. 1985 was the first year in which offsets for pollutants other than volatile organic compounds
were traded.
72. AER*X Corp. (1986) (unpublished report); South Coast Air Quality Management Dist.,
Final Air Quality Management Plan, 1982 Revision (stationary sources only on file with authors).
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While the increase in trading activity from 1983 to 1985 indicates that an
active market in offsets may be developing in the area, the significant vari-
ations in price and number of trades indicate that this market has not
reached an equilibrium. A second indication of this disequilibrium is the
fact that only a very small proportion of the total emissions in the area are
being traded.7"
It is unlikely that insufficient demand can explain the absence of a
smoothly functioning market in areas such as the SCAQMD because
demand for offsets should be high in nonattainment areas experiencing
economic growth. Therefore, the lack of an active market for offsets can-
not be attributed to unwillingness of buyers; offset buyers must obtain
offsets. Instead, the failure of an active market to emerge results from the
lack of readily identifiable offset sellers.74 If transaction costs could be re-
duced, smoothly functioning markets might quickly develop in some areas
of the country.
There is another economic advantage to using offsets, although it is dif-
ficult to quantify. When a firm decides to locate a major emission source
in a nonattainment area, it knows that it must obtain offsets and meet
stringent emission limits. The fact that it does not locate in an attainment
area, where it would not need to obtain offsets, is a clear indication that
the economic value of the nonattainment location outweighs the economic
cost of obtaining offsets. While not easily measured, in our opinion this
gain is significant in the aggregate.
Some evidence indicates that certain offset trades may not protect air
quality in the manner intended.75  Due to inadequacies in the emission
inventories used for SIPs and because allowable emissions frequently
exceed actual emissions from existing sources, many offsets are created by
revising the permit of an existing source to reflect an emission reduction
that has already occurred.7 Nevertheless, because there have been only
73. Anecdotal evidence regarding the manner in which prices are determined also provides inter-
esting insights into the nature of this market. In a 1982 study of offset transactions, including three in
the SCAQMD, General Accounting Office researchers observed that firms constructing new emission
sources found it difficult to identify potential sellers of offsets. However, when potential offset sources
were located, the procedure for negotiating a price for the offsets generally involved the prospective
buyer offering a price based on the seller's expected cost for producing the offset. Although the price
finally negotiated apparently sometimes exceeded that expected cost, the value of the offset to the
purchaser seems not to have significantly affected the transaction price. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 52, at 96. While offset prices in the SCAQMD have increased since that time, they are
still set primarily by reference to sellers' costs rather than the value to buyers. Palmisano interview,
supra note 64.
74. There are no ready means for buyers and sellers to identify each other. It is not unusual for
buyers to pay fees of several thousand dollars for a consultant to assist in the search for offsets.
Palmisano interview, supra note 64.
75. R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at 128-29.
76. DAMES & MOORE, supra note 44, at 4-74 to 4-75; NAT'L COMM'N, supra note 44, at 3.4 to
3.44.
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about two thousand offset transactions and because regulators have gener-
ally been careful to ensure that these transactions have not had a signifi-
cant adverse impact on air quality, we conclude that the total impact of
offsets on environmental quality is not significant.7
B. Bubbles
Bubbles provide a way for a firm to increase emissions at one or more
emission sources in exchange for larger decreases at other emission sources
so that the total emissions from a facility do not exceed the sum of all the
sources' individual emission limits. Two conditions must exist for a firm
to have sufficient incentives to use a bubble. First, regulators must require
the firm to employ an inefficient mix of emissions controls. Second, the
marginal costs of emissions control for different sources operated by the
firm must vary widely enough so that the cost savings from increasing the
cost-effectiveness of the mix of controls justify the cost of the bubble-
approval process.
The use of bubbles rarely involves external trading to acquire ERCs;
all but two of the bubbles approved by EPA have involved only internal
trades. One of these external trades involved a temporary lease of credits
until a firm could meet emission standards by replacing a manufacturing
plant; the other involved a purchase of credits.
Since its inception in 1979,8 the bubble policy has been a subject of
controversy both inside and outside EPA for two reasons. First, bubbles
are used in nonattainment areas, where reductions in emissions are needed
to achieve ambient air quality standards. This has created controversy
even though EPA has approved plans incorporating bubbles for many of
these areas, plans that were projected to lead to compliance with air qual-
ity standards. Second, in some instances, firms have used (or tried to use)
bubbles to avoid requirements for additional emission reductions. 9
EPA has approved forty-two bubbles for firms emitting particulate
matter, sulfur dioxides, and volatile organic compounds. 80 Table 3 sum-
marizes information about bubbles at different stages of development for
each pollutant at the beginning of 1986.
77. See infra note 146.
78. Air Programs, Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 40 C.F.R. pt. 52 (1987).
79. See R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at 98-99 (describing history of controversy and various interest
groups involved).
80. Envtl. Protection Agency, Regulatory Reform Staff [hereinafter Regulatory Reform Staff]
(unpublished data on file with authors); Envtl. Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation [here-
inafter Office of Air and Radiation] (unpublished report on file with authors); Energy and Environ-
mental Analysis, Inc., Revised Reviews of Permits Issued under Environmental Protection Agency's
Emissions Trading Policy (Aug. 30, 1985) [hereinafter Revised Reviews] (reports prepared for EPA
Office of Air and Radiation Programs) (on file with authors); Energy and Environmental Analysis
Inc., Initial Review of Permits Issued under Environmental Protection Agency's Emissions Trading
Policy (Aug. 30, 1985) [hereinafter Initial Review] (reports prepared for EPA Office of Air and
Radiation Programs) (on file with authors).



















The 1987 deadline for meeting air quality standards for ozone spurred
firms producing volatile organic compounds to use bubbles. The fifth col-
umn of Table 3 details reported cost savings of firms from the use of
bubbles, almost all of which are large. Apparently, firms use bubbles only
if they provide large cost savings." This is a reflection both of the expense
of planning and preparing a bubble application and of firms' judgments of
the low probability of bubble approval.
In addition to bubbles approved by EPA, eighty-nine bubbles had been
approved under state generic bubble rules as of 1984.83 Nearly all of these
bubbles were for volatile organic compounds, which may be partially due
to the fact that compliance deadlines had not yet expired for volatile
organic compounds. However, it is primarily due to the fact that most
states with generic rules for bubbles have such rules only for volatile or-
ganic compound bubbles."
Comparison of the number of bubbles under review for each pollutant
and the pattern of bubble applications made by firms over time yields
additional insight into bubble activity. Table 3 shows that while the num-
bers of bubble applications for the three pollutants are almost equal,
many more bubbles for volatile organic compounds are being reviewed or
developed than for total suspended particulates or sulfur dioxide.
Figure 1 shows the number of state and federal bubble applications under
review for each pollutant.
82. This reflects the fact that large cost savings result when a firm switches from oil to natural gas
in boilers, which is what most of these bubbles involve. In addition, this fuel switch can be accom-
plished at relatively low cost. Two caveats apply. First, firms may have an incentive to overstate their
savings from bubbles in order to provide a stronger justification for EPA to allow the use of bubbles.
Unless this overstatement is very large, it would not materially affect this conclusion. Second, it may
be that firms are more likely to report their cost savings if those savings are large. However, there is
no evidence that this is the case.
83. 1984 NATIONAL AIR AUDIT DATA, supra note 62. EPA approves state generic rules as part
of a state's implementation plan. 33 of these bubbles were approved under generic rules reviewed and
approved by EPA, and the remainder were approved under generic rules not approved by EPA. EPA
can take enforcement action against firms with bubbles without EPA-approved generic rules, but the
Agency's approach in practice is apparently to work with the states in order to get the generic rules
approved in a manner which satisfies EPA requirements.
84. It is easier to get EPA approval for generic rules for volatile organic compounds. Comment
from Michael Levin, EPA Regulatory Reform Staff, to Robert Hahn (Apr. 22, 1987) (discussing
findings in this Article) (on file with authors).
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Figure 2 shows the number of bubble applications
year between 1980 and 1984.86
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85. Regulatory Reform Staff, supra note 80.
86. These data include only those applications that have been approved or proposed for approval
by EPA because these are the only bubbles for which application dates were available.
87. Regulatory Reform Staff, supra note 80.
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Three factors explain the pattern of bubble activity. First, as the 1987
attainment deadlines approached,88 there was a strong movement towards
use of bubbles.89 Figure 1 indicates that a large number of bubbles for
volatile organic compounds were in the review and development stages as
the 1987 attainment deadlines drew near. 90 Figure 2 shows that the num-
ber of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter bubble applications declined
after the compliance deadline for these pollutants passed in 1982. Appar-
ently, large potential cost savings alone are not sufficient to induce some
firms to use bubbles, since there is no reason to believe that potential cost
savings declined after compliance deadlines passed.
As shown in Figure 2, a second factor influencing bubble activity was
the uncertainty created among regulators and private firms by EPA's
1982 change in its bubble policy.91 In response to industry complaints
about difficulties in the approval process, EPA instituted an interim policy
intended to facilitate approvals. However, these actions created uncer-
tainty among regulators, especially over what baselines to use in calculat-
ing emission reductions and whether credits from plant shutdowns could
be used for bubbles.92 This uncertainty led EPA to impose an informal
suspension on consideration of applications for bubbles in nonattainment
areas.9" This action did not alleviate uncertainty, and thus some firms
were probably discouraged from developing bubbles.94
The third factor influencing bubble activity is the governmental unit
that implements the program. States have approved over twice as many
88. The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act extended 1982 deadlines for particulate matter,
sulfur dioxide, and volatile organic compounds to 1987. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2) (1982).
89. The effect of attainment deadlines on the level of bubble applications is easily explained. Prior
to a deadline, state regulators are free to determine how best to meet air quality standards. The state
can grant a compliance extension to a firm based on an application for a bubble that will bring the
firm's total emissions within the level set in the SIP. After an attainment deadline expires, however,
EPA requires that the SIP demonstrate how it will meet air quality standards. State regulators can
no longer grant compliance extensions to firms without EPA approval. Thus, the submission of bub-
ble applications prior to a deadline may enable a firm to secure a compliance extension in order to
implement the bubble. Extensions are unlikely for applications submitted after a deadline.
90. Given the 1987 attainment deadline for ozone, the number of applications for volatile organic
compounds can be expected to decline after 1988. The extension of this deadline pending re-
authorization of the Clean Air Act may also have the effect of postponing the period in which bubble
applications can be expected to decline, although firms' reaction to the accompanying uncertainty
about the effects of amendments to the Act make this difficult to anticipate.
91. Emissions Trading Policy Statement, General Principles for Creation, Banking, and Use of
Emission Reduction Credits, Proposed Policy, 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076 (1982).
92. S. CONNOLLY, supra note 44, at 14-15; R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at 51-59.
93. Interview with Barry Elman, Staff Member, EPA Regulatory Reform Staff (Dec. 9, 1985);
Interview with Rob Brenner, Staff Member, EPA Office of Air and Radiation (Dec. 9, 1985).
Because this suspension of bubble reviews was informal, it is likely that review of bubbles has not
completely ceased. However, review activity certainly has slowed significantly. Bubble applications
already under review at EPA Headquarters were not subject to the suspension.
94. See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text (effect of uncertainty on level of emissions
trading activity).
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bubbles under generic rules as have been approved by EPA.9 States have
approved more bubbles because state rules contain fewer steps96 in the
review and approval process than do EPA rules.9 These additional steps
are time consuming and costly to the firm submitting a bubble application.
EPA estimated in 1985 that the 42 bubbles it had approved had re-
sulted in cost savings of $300 million99 and that potential cost savings
from the more than 200 bubbles in the United States, including those
approved by the states and those under review or development, amounted
to over $800 million.99 Although EPA's cost savings estimates may be
somewhat high,1"' bubbles clearly produced substantial cost savings. This
is impressive evidence that firms can and will take advantage of the flexi-
bility offered by emissions trading to reduce emissions control costs in
spite of the incremental nature of bubble policy implementation. Firms
choosing to apply for bubbles have done so in the face of considerable
uncertainty deriving both from EPA's delays in resolving questions about
its bubble policy"0 and from the uncertainty associated with a new
program.
95. As of 1986, at least 89 generic bubbles have been approved by states as compared to 42 EPA-
approved bubbles.
96. To get a bubble approved by EPA requires the additional steps of Regional Office review,
review at EPA Headquarters, a notice of proposed approval in the Federal Register and a subsequent
public comment period, and notice of final approval in the Federal Register.
97. As noted, the prevalent use of state-approved bubbles may also be due in part to the uncer-
tainty that existed under the 1982 EPA bubble policy.
98. Envtl. Protection Agency, Regulatory Reform Office, Emissions Trading Status Report Uan.
1, 1986) [hereinafter Status Report] (on file with authors). These figures do not include cost savings
for bubbles approved by states under generic rules not approved by EPA.
99. Id.
100. EPA apparently attributes average savings of approximately $3 million to each bubble
approved under state generic rules. As noted above, most state generic bubble rules apply only to
volatile organic compounds. For EPA-approved volatile organic compound bubbles, the maximum
capital cost savings reported was $3 million. The potential cost savings need not be as high to justify
going through the bubble permitting process under state generic rules as they must be to justify going
through the more expensive EPA-approval process. Therefore, average cost savings from state-
approved bubbles are likely to be lower than those from EPA-approved bubbles. An estimate of the
average savings for bubbles approved under state generic rules of $1.5 million is probably more rea-
sonable. This would put savings from the 89 state-approved bubbles at approximately $135 million,
and total potential savings from all bubbles at approximately $650 million. This includes the 49
bubbles approved or proposed for approval by EPA, the 89 approved by the states, and the 91
reported to be under review or development. This estimate is intended to reflect one-time cost savings
for firms. It is difficult to discern in many cases whether the cost savings reported to EPA are capital
costs only or whether some savings in annual operating costs are included. In the few cases where
both types of savings have been reported separately, capital cost savings have generally been much
more significant than operating cost savings.
101. For a sense of the evolution of EPA's policy over time, see Emissions Offset Interpretive
Ruling, 44 Fed. Reg. 3274 (1979) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51); Emissions Trading Policy
Statement, General Principles for Creation, Banking, and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, Pro-
posed Policy, 47 Fed. Reg. 15,976, 15,976-77 (1982); Emissions Trading Policy Statement, General
Principles for Creation, Banking, and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, Request for Further Com-
ment, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,580, 39,580-84 (1983); Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,816
(1986).
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The current level at which bubbles are used clearly does not reflect the
potential impact of the program. Moreover, the fact that only two hun-
dred bubbles have been used shows that this policy has not led to the
development of a market in emission credits."02 If firms use bubbles pri-
marily to comply with emission limits, but can no longer do so because the
1987 attainment deadlines have expired, then bubble activity can be ex-
pected to decline in the absence of changes in bubble policy."'
The effect of bubbles on environmental quality is unclear. One EPA
official reported that the majority of bubbles led to "substantially greater
emission reductions than conventional limits, with the rest producing
equivalent reductions."1 04 Evidence from another EPA office indicates,
however, that although some bubbles may reduce allowable emissions,
they have little or no impact on actual emissions and few lead to signifi-
cant emission reductions." 5 Thus, although we recognize that a few bub-
bles have enabled firms to avoid making emission reductions that they oth-
erwise would have been required to make, there is no evidence to indicate
what precise effects bubbles have had on air quality. We conclude that the
net impact of bubbles on environmental quality has not been significant.
C. Banking
Since EPA approval in 1979, banking has provided a means for a firm
to save emission credits.'0 6 Because states are not required to establish
banking programs,' the ability of a firm to bank credits depends upon
the existence of a state regulatory program. Such a program must assess
the quantity and validity of banked emission credits and specify the rules
for using these credits.
Firms bank emission credits if doing so establishes a property right in
102. To our knowledge, only two of these bubbles involved external trading.
103. See infra notes 175-88 and accompanying text (discussion of EPA's emissions trading
policy).
104. Levin, The Supreme Court's "Bubble" Decision: What It Means, EPA J. 11 (1984). Levin
was the head of EPA's Regulatory Reform Staff, an office which is the primary advocate of emissions
trading within EPA. It is clearly in the interest of emissions trading advocates to emphasize gains in
environmental quality which result from emissions trading.
105. This conclusion is based on analyses contained in Revised Reviews, supra note 80 (compila-
tion of data for permits 1-20); Initial Review, supra note 80 (compilation of data for permits 21-37).
These reports indicate the difficulty of assessing the environmental impact of bubbles which encom-
pass several production processes. They also illustrate how difficult it is to assess the impact on envi-
ronmental quality of bubbles in which shutdowns of existing sources have been used to provide reduc-
tion credits, since this requires some determination of what would have happened if a bubble had not
been used.
106. Emission Offset Interpretive Ruling, 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3282 (1979) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 51).
107. States are not required to implement any of the emissions trading programs. See Final Trad-
ing Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,830, 43,830-31.
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an asset that has a value at least equal to the cost of creating the asset.
Banked emission credits are valuable assets because they can be used as
offsets or for netting. 08 In addition, these credits may be sold to other
firms.' 0 9 In theory, banking should reduce the uncertainty surrounding a
firm's ability to use completed emission reductions in future emissions
trading transactions. In practice, however, the potential for changes in
emission control requirements raises the possibility of confiscation or elim-
ination of banked emission credits, thus discouraging firms from banking.
Banking has had limited use because state and local rules that allow
banking must be approved by EPA."0 As of 1986, EPA had approved
banking rules for only five state or local agencies."' Eight more agencies
had adopted banking rules, some of which were submitted to EPA for
review."' Of all these programs, only the banking program in Louisville,
Kentucky can be described as active. Eighteen firms have deposited 26,000
tons per year of emission credits into this bank." 8 In addition, two firms
with EPA-approved bubbles have used credits from this bank."" The
bank has provided offsets for nine external trades and nineteen internal
trades."' This activity can be attributed to two factors. First, this pro-
gram places few restrictions on the use of banked credits and its rules for
trading are clear and detailed. Second, the bank facilitates a smoothly
functioning market by maintaining a public ledger that enables buyers to
locate potential sellers easily." 6
Other banking programs have had little activity either in terms of emis-
sion credits banked or in terms of internal or external transactions involv-
ing banked credits." 7 This lack of activity has two causes. First, there is
108. See infra notes 125-44 and accompanying text (discussion of netting).
109. Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,831 (1986). For a review of this policy, see
infra notes 175-88 and accompanying text.
110. Although many banking programs have been established by local agencies, this Article does
not distinguish between state and local regulatory agencies.
111. Oregon; Missouri; Rhode Island; Lane County, Oregon; and Puget Sound, Washington.
112. Pima County, Arizona; Jefferson County, Kentucky; 'Middlesex County, New Jersey; Alle-
gheny County, Pennsylvania; and four air pollution control districts in California. In addition, at least
seven other agencies are developing or considering banking rules. Status Report, supra note 98, at 2.
18 states expressly forbid banking or have regulatory officials who have expressed antipathy toward
banking. ELI, supra note 49. The remaining state and local regulatory agencies have not developed
either banking rules or a position on banking.
113. Telephone interviews with Michael DeBusschere, Air Pollution Control Officer, Jefferson
County Pollution Control District (Kentucky) (Aug. 21, Sept. 16, Sept. 22, 1986); telephone interview
with David Bray, EPA Region X (Sept. 4, 1986); telephone interview with John Anderson, Puget
Sound Air Pollution Control Agency (Sept. 8, 1986).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (discussion of negative effect of transaction
costs).
117. Telephone interviews with officials from state or local agencies with formal banking (notes
on file with authors).
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often little potential for using banked emission credits. For example,
although Rhode Island has a banking program, because it is an attain-
ment area, there is no need for firms to use offsets for new or modified
emission sources. 1 ' Thus, no firms have applied to bank emission credits.
Furthermore, restrictions placed on the use of emission credits, such as
limiting their use to offsets or to internal use, make them even less useful.
The second reason for a lack of banking activity is the uncertainty sur-
rounding the nature and value of the property right in banked emission
credits. Confiscation of banked emission credits remains a concern for
firms. Several banking programs incorporate provisions for banked emis-
sion credits to be discounted or partially confiscated by state regulators if
certain events occur. When a state or local regulatory agency is unable to
comply with air quality standards, these banked emission credits may be
reduced or eliminated entirely." 9 Time limits on the validity of banked
emission credits also create the potential for confiscation. Many banking
rules contain limits on the life of banked emission credits. 2 If a firm
intends to use its own banked emission credits, there may be uncertainty
about whether it will be able to employ the credits during their useful
lifetime; if the firm intends to sell banked emission credits, this uncer-
tainty is compounded because the firm cannot anticipate when an oppor-
tunity to sell the credits will arise. The possibility that banked emissions
credits may be confiscated, through discounting, regulatory change, or lim-
its on the credits' lives, has clearly discouraged firms from engaging in
banking.
The current level of banking activity is far less than expected; thus it
has had little effect in terms of either cost savings or improved air qual-
ity. 2' Emission credit banks promote environmental quality only when a
firm banks emission credits in order to reduce emissions beyond regulatory
requirements. The small number of deposits in emission credit banks indi-
cates that few firms are creating and banking credits for their asset
value. "' As a result, banking has not improved environmental quality.
In addition to banks established under formal rules, commonly called
"formal banks," at least twelve state or local agencies allow "informal
118. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text (discussion of impact of being within a nonat-
tainment area); see also R.I. Air Pollution Control Regulations § 9.1.3 (uncodified administrative
regulations).
119. This type of provision is included in banking rules in Kentucky.
120. These include Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington. See Idaho
Air Pollution Regulations §§ 1-1906.7 (uncodified administrative regulations); IND. ADMIN. CODE tit.
324, r. 2-3, § 4(a); Maine Air Pollution Control Regulations ch. 113, § 4 (uncodified administrative
regulations); 25 PA. CODE § 127.67; VT. ADMIN. PROC. COMP. § 5-502(6)(c); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 170-403-070, 173-403-075.
121. R. LIROFF, supra note 23; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 52.
122. See supra note 113.
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banking." A few of these agencies also have established formal banks.'
Details regarding the operation of informal banks are difficult to obtain
because they are not governed by written rules in most cases. They gener-
ally involve informal arrangements between firms and regulators that
allow the saving of emission reductions greater than those required by
regulations-without a change in the firm's operating permits-for future
use in internal emissions trading transactions. Informed sources indicate
that there may be more informal banking than formal banking."2 4
Firms using informal banking may realize significant cost savings for
two reasons. First, by using informal banking, firms reduce emissions con-
trol costs because this type of banking enables firms to use prior emission
reductions to avoid the cost of complying with new reduction require-
ments. Second, firms realize reduced permitting costs when informally
banked emission reductions are used for netting transactions.
Unfortunately, informal banking does not provide information for
external trades. In fact, it restricts the use of emission credits to internal
transactions, since no regulatory agency allows the use of informally
banked emission credits in external transactions unless they are converted
to formally recognized emission credits through changes in operating per-
mits. As a result, the existence of informal banks may actually impede the
formation of markets for emission credits. In contrast, formal banks that
make records of deposits public are more likely to promote market forma-
tion because they provide a means for sellers to identify buyers.
D. Netting
Netting allows a firm to increase emissions from one source if it
decreases emissions from another source so that the net increase does not
equal a major source.'1 5 In doing so, a firm that is modifying an existing
emission source can avoid the most stringent emission limits and experi-
ence fewer complications in obtaining a permit.' The basic premise of
netting is that if a source modification results in an emissions increase that
is less than if the source were classified as major, the source modification
123. ELI, supra note 49; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 52.
124. Ritts interview, supra note 63; Telephone interview with Charles Bauscll, Researcher, Gen-
eral Accounting Office (Aug. 20, 1986).
125. Netting permits internal trading, not external trading. A firm may engage in netting whether
the existing modified source is classified as major or minor. However, the firm must obtain a minor
source permit and the source must comply with the emission limits in that permit. The modified
source is also subject to any additional permit requirements that are contained in SIPs and to mini-
mum emission limits set by EPA. However, none of these limits or requirements are as stringent as
those that would apply to the source if it were to go through the permitting process as a major new
source, as it would have to if netting were not used.
126. An "existing source," in this context, can be an entire plant containing many individual
points at which emissions are produced.
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will not significantly harm air quality. Thus, the net change in emissions
resulting from netting can be positive, and may be barely below the
major-source level set by the state regulatory agenda.""7
Netting has been allowed in varying forms since 1974. EPA estimated
that by the end of 1984, "several hundred" firms had used netting. 28
From available data it appears that netting is the most commonly used
emissions trading activity by a wide margin. In 1984, the only year for
which detailed data are available, an estimated 900 sources used net-
ting." 9 This is about fifteen times as often as offsets were used during the
same year, and it is far more often than bubbles have ever been used.
Given the degree of uncertainty associated with extrapolating from one
year's data, it is reasonable to estimate that approximately 5000 to 12,000
sources have used netting since 1974, with 8000 being the most probable
value within this range. 8 °
127. Depending on the state and the pollutant involved, this emission level may be as high as 250
tons per year. 1984 NATIONAL AIR AUDIT DATA, supra note 62.
128. Envtl. Protection Agency, Office of Standards and Regulations & Office of Policy, Planning
and Evaluation, Annual Report CY 1984 (May 1985) (on file with authors).
129. In 1984, state and local agencies issued 17,148 permits to new and modified sources. EPA
examined 360 permits issued to minor sources in detail. Of these, 21 were sources that would have
been considered major on the basis of the emissions from their modifications, had they not used net-
ting. This is a conservative estimate because it includes only permits for which the data obtained
clearly indicate that the modified source would have been major had netting not been used. Informa-
tion on several other permits indicated that the sources may have used netting, but inconsistencies in
data entries made it impossible to make a definitive determination.
These 21 permits represent 5.9% of the 360 permits examined. Assuming that a similar percentage
of the 15,303 minor sources receiving permits in 1984 used netting, about 900 sources receiving per-
mits in 1984 used netting. Only 57 major source nonattainment area permits, which required offsets,
were issued during the same period. Thus, about fifteen times as many permits issued in 1984
involved netting as involved offsets. 1984 NATIONAL AIR AUDIT DATA, supra note 62.
Note that this estimate is based on the assumption that netting took place with equal frequency,
relative to the number of minor-source permits issued, in attainment areas and nonattainment areas.
It might also be reasonable to assume that netting took place only in attainment areas. During about
half of 1984, a Federal Circuit Court ruling against the use of netting in nonattainment areas was in
effect. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub
nom., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). If one
assumes that the proportion of all minor-source permits issued in attainment areas is similar to that
for major-source permits (67%), and that only minor sources in attainment areas used netting in 1984,
then approximately 600 minor sources used netting in 1984. The object here is not to estimate the
exact number of sources that used netting, but rather to make a reliable estimate of the relative
magnitude of netting transactions compared to other emissions trading activities. During the history of
the netting program, from 1974 to the present, there have certainly been periods when little or no
netting took place in nonattainment areas. However, we are unable to make any estimates of the
duration of these periods that are sufficiently accurate to fine tune our estimate of total netting activ-
ity. Therefore, our estimates of netting activity are based on the assumption that it took place in both
attainment areas and nonattainment areas throughout its history.
130. This estimate must take into account the following factors: (1) of those sources that could
have used netting, the proportion that has actually done so has probably increased over time as firms
become more familiar with the possibilities of emissions trading; (2) regulations and court decisions
on netting have changed over time so that netting opportunities have been more or less constrained at
different times; and (3) fluctuations in economic activity have influenced the number of major modifi-
cations of sources over time. Since data to support an exact estimate of the effects of these factors are
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The data also indicate that a similar number of firms receiving minor-
source permits in 1984 avoided being classified as major sources by agree-
ing to state permit restrictions on operating conditions for the new source
or modification being permitted. Examples of such restrictions include
limitations on the annual hours of operation and constraints on the type
or sulfur content of fuels used."' 1 Although such restrictions are not tech-
nically a part of emissions trading, the result for the firm receiving the
permit is the same as the result of netting. Classification as a minor source
avoids the permitting, modelling, monitoring, and some of the emissions
control requirements to which a major source would be subject.
Estimating the total cost savings from netting is difficult because of the
uncertainty surrounding both the number of netting transactions and the
varying cost savings to individual firms. There are generally two sources
of potential cost savings that may result from netting. First, netting
enables firms to reduce emissions control costs when classification as a
major source would subject the firm to more stringent emission limits."' 2
The magnitude of emissions control cost savings from netting varies ac-
not available, an estimate with a wide range to reflect uncertainty about the exact number of netting
transactions is appropriate. The average number of netting transactions per year since 1975 probably
falls between the 1984 estimate of 900 (if firms net in both attainment and nonattainment areas) and
600 (if firms net only in attainment areas). See supra note 129. If an average of 750 netting transac-
tions took place during those years, 8000 total transactions would have occurred.
131. Of 15,139 minor sources receiving permits in 1984, 761 avoided being permitted as major
sources through use of such restrictions. Texas did not supply information on this aspect of its permit
writing. As a result, the total number of minor permits differs slightly from the preceding analysis.
1984 NATIONAL AIR AUDIT DATA, supra note 62.
132. New major sources locating in nonattainment areas must comply with EPA's Lowest Achiev-
able Emissions Rates (LAER), which require the most costly and technologically advanced emissions
controls. Even in areas never classified as nonattainment, new major sources may have to implement
the Best Available Control Technologies (BACT), which is also a very stringent standard. Sources
classified as minor may still be subject to EPA's New Source Permit Standards (NSPS), but if NSPS
do not apply, or if NSPS requirements are less onerous than LAER or BACT, netting will signifi-
cantly reduce emission control costs.
Available evidence indicates that a high proportion of sources using netting would not be subject to
any NSPS. A 1986 study concludes that NSPS only apply to 32% of non-utility major new sources. L.
Hayes, M. Baviello & G. Sugiyama, (paper presented at the Air Pollution Control Ass'n Ann. Meet-
ing) (1986) (on file with authors). Our own analysis of 197 BACT and LAER determinations made
in 1984 indicates that roughly 50% of the firms using netting would avoid NSPS emission limits as
well as BACT or LAER. 1984 NATIONAL AIR AUDIT DATA, supra note 62. Another study con-
ducted in 1983 found that only one of twelve modified sources studied which used netting was subject
to NSPS. ETA ENGINEERING, INC., NETTING OUT OF NEW SOURCE REVIEW: THE EXPERIENCE IN
ILLINOIS 10 (1984) [hereinafter ETA] (report prepared for EPA Regulatory Reform Staff) (on file
with authors). While not conclusive, this study tends to support the view that sources not subject to an
NSPS will be the most frequent users of netting. The possibility that additional limits in state imple-
mentation plans apply to sources using netting complicates the issue of emission control cost savings,
but does not fundamentally alter the preceding analysis.
However, if NSPS do apply, "the general tendency is to specify [BACT or LAER] emission limits
equivalent to NSPS." DAMES & MOORE, supra note 44, at 4-6. Sources which would be subject to
NSPS after netting would thus often realize no savings in emission control costs. Their only incentive
to use netting would be the potential savings in permitting costs.
Emissions Trading
cording to individual circumstances, such as control costs and the emission
limits to which a firm is subject after netting. A 1983 study of netting in
Illinois found that "a 200 ton [per year] controlled emission level" volatile
organic compound emission source might save one million dollars in con-
trol costs by using netting.'" 8 However, this study's authors have indicated
that this level of savings may be higher than the average savings from
netting.1"4 Moreover, any netting savings would be somewhat offset by the
cost of achieving the emission reductions. Thus, we estimate a reasonable
range of estimated average cost savings is $100,000 to $1 million per
source. This calculation yields a range of total estimated cost savings of
$500 million to $12 billion. 6 The lower end of this range is approxi-
mately equal to the total estimated savings from bubbles.' 36 Hence, it ap-
pears that netting is the most frequently used emissions trading activity
and it has yielded the greatest aggregate cost savings.' 37
Firms also realize cost savings from netting because they avoid the per-
mitting procedures that apply to major sources. These procedures consist
of preparing permit applications, modelling air quality impacts, and mon-
itoring emissions.'3s A 1982 EPA report indicated that the total costs for
these procedures ranged from $6800 to $25,000 with an average of about
$15,000.' s  Although preparing the permit application itself adds costs,
these costs do not differ significantly for major sources and sources using
netting, since approval of netting requires significant interaction with reg-
ulators. Thus, a reasonable estimate of the range of average permitting
cost savings from netting is $5000 to $25,000. " ° The estimate of 5000 to
133. ETA, supra note 132, at 11. In the EPA data used to estimate the total number of netting
transactions, the mean emission rate for individual pollutants from the 21 sources that used netting
was 307 tons per year, and the median emission rate for individual pollutants from these sources was
206 tons per year. 1984 NATIONAL AIR AUDIT DATA, supra note 62. If these figures are typical of
all sources using netting, then savings of $1 million might be typical of netting transactions in general.
134. Telephone interview with Jay Norco, Executive Vice President ETA Engineering, Inc. and
Kevin Croke, ETA Engineering, Inc., (Oct. 12, 13, 1986).
135. This is the estimated capital cost for equipment and measures necessary to meet the emission
limits that were avoided by using netting. It does not include operating costs. These figures are not
adjusted for inflation.
136. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
137. Because external trading is not permitted with netting, these savings result from internal
trading. See supra note 121.
138. Data collected on 81 PSD area major source permits issued in 1984 indicate that 37 (46%)
were required to undertake pre-construction monitoring, 45 (56%) were required to do "increment
analysis" modelling, and 62 (77%) were required to do air quality analyses. In contrast, only 81
(23%) of 360 sources receiving minor source permits studied were required to do air quality analyses.
1984 NATIONAL AIR AUDIT DATA, supra note 62.
139. PERMITTING EXPERIENCE, supra note 62, at 155-56 (Aug. 1982) (examining costs of mod-
elling and monitoring air quality impacts for 6 non-utility firms preparing major-source PSD permit
applications).
140. Regulatory Reform Staff, supra note 80 (finding savings of up to $100,000 for firms in this
category using netting).
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12,000 total netting transactions yields an estimate of permitting cost sav-
ings of $25 million to $300 million.
In addition to producing these cost savings, netting allows firms to avoid
the delays in approval of construction that occur as a result of going
through a major-source permit process. Indeed, according to Illinois state
officials, "the avoidance of delay and permit negotiation were ranked
highest" among the incentives for firms to use netting, ahead of savings in
control costs.141 Hence, while not quantifiable, the potential significance of
this factor should not be overlooked.
Netting is designed to have little impact on environmental quality. If
the emission reductions firms use in netting are reductions in actual emis-
sions, then these firms will increase their total emissions by quantities that
fall below the major source thresholds. States set these thresholds at low
levels so that the impact on air quality should be insignificant. However,
if many firms with modified sources use netting in a single area, this may
have an adverse impact on local air quality. This negative impact will be
significant only when several sources are netting without reducing actual
emissions. 42 As noted above, state regulators review and approve netting,
and they have the discretion to impose permit conditions requiring addi-
tional emission reductions if netting has adversely affected local environ-
mental quality. Thus, netting has probably not had a significant adverse
impact on environmental quality.""
For all its benefits, netting does not promote markets in emission cred-
its. All netting transactions are internal trades because emission credits
obtained through external trades may not be used in netting. Netting may
even discourage the formation of markets because firms save emission
reductions for their own use rather than sell them to other firms."'
IV. Explaining the Performance of Emissions Trading
Table 4 summarizes emissions trading activities and their impact on
emissions control costs and environmental quality." 5 Table 4 reveals that
emissions trading as a whole has led to cost savings in the billions of dol-
141. ETA, supra note 132, at 12.
142. Even if such paper credits are used in many cases, they reduce a firm's discretion to use their
emissions because the reductions in allowable emissions become enforceable by state regulators.
143. One study of the environmental impact of netting concludes that "[in all likelihood the
impact of netting in nonattainment areas [in Illinois between 1983 and 1987] would be much lower
than one percent [increase in total emission levels]." ETA, supra note 132, at 18.
144. Id., at 9; NAT'L COMM'N, supra note 44, at 3.4 to 4.8; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 52, at 55, 65, 93.
145. Cost savings for netting are stated in terms of 1984 dollars, since they are based on an
estimate of savings for a typical firm using netting that year. Cost savings for bubbles are stated in
terms of current dollars at the time each bubble was approved. Bubble cost savings are based on both
EPA estimates and data reported by firms using bubbles.
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lars and has had a negligible effect on environmental quality.146 The fore-
going examination of the individual components of emissions trading leads
to four observations.
1. Netting is the most frequently used activity, followed by offsets and
then bubbles. Offsets are mandatory for new sources in nonattainment
areas, so it is not surprising that they are used often. The use of netting is
surprising when one considers that netting can only be used by firms
when they are modifying an existing source, whereas bubbles can be used
by firms with existing sources, which far outnumber new and modified
sources. Thus, many more firms would appear to be in a position to bene-
fit from bubbles than from netting.
2. Most trading is internal. This is surprising because the differences in
marginal emissions control costs necessary to make trading advantageous
appear more likely to exist if more than one firm's sources are involved in
a trade.14 Therefore, one might expect that external trading would occur
more frequently than internal trading. However, the predominance of
internal trading is less surprising if one considers the high transaction
costs associated with identifying buyers and sellers and obtaining approval
of external trades.1
4 8
3. Activities controlled and regulated by the states, such as netting and
offsets, are used by firms much more frequently than the federally-
controlled bubble program. Even generic bubbles, which are available to
firms in only a few states, have been used more frequently than EPA-
approved bubbles.
4. Banking activity is almost nonexistent. Banking might be expected to
be the backbone of emissions trading because of the four elements of emis-
sions trading, it has the greatest potential of bringing together buyers and
sellers. In fact, banking has been almost totally ineffective in promoting
trading activity.""
146. The assessment of the effect of emissions trading on environmental quality presented in this
Article is primarily based on the fact that the rules governing the various trading programs contain
prohibitions against trades that would result in significant increases in emissions. Statements of state
and federal regulators interviewed for a study of emissions trading commissioned by EPA provide
evidence that these safeguards have been effective. "In general, the [riegional and state personnel
interviewed believe that emissions trading has not harmed air quality." S. CONNOLLY, supra note 44,
at 28.
147. The more sources there are, the more likely these differences exist. Similarly, the more firms
potentially participating, the larger the amount of potential sources.
148. See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
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Nothing by itself can explain all aspects of emissions trading. However,
the cumulative effect of three factors explains much about the pattern of
emissions trading activity: first, the different regulatory treatment of new
and existing emission sources; second, uncertainties associated with prop-
erty rights; and third, transaction costs for firms attempting to buy or to
sell credits.
A. Regulatory Treatment of New and Existing Emission Sources
The regulatory system established under the Clean Air Act places a
substantial burden on new sources of emissions because it imposes more
stringent emission limits on new sources than on existing sources.' 50 As a
result, new sources are at a competitive disadvantage. Netting, when feasi-
ble, is a very effective tool because its use results in a modified source that
avoids the more stringent emissions control standards that apply when an
entirely new major source is created. Thus, it is not surprising that a firm
uses netting whenever feasible. In contrast, bubbles are used by unmodi-
fied existing sources. to meet emission limits. In both attainment and
nonattainment areas, the requirements for existing sources are usually sig-
nificantly less stringent (and less costly to implement) than those for new
sources. Therefore, most existing sources are not nearly as hard pressed as
are new sources to reduce their emissions. This partly explains why there
are few bubbles in comparison to the apparent number of firms that could
use them.
Sunk costs are another key difference between new and existing
sources. New sources have no sunk costs; therefore firms can take advan-
tage of the flexibility afforded by emissions trading. Firms with existing
sources are likely to have invested in emissions control equipment, thereby
constraining their ability to adjust emissions control strategies. Because
bubbles were not allowed until 1979, seven years after the amendments to
the Clean Air Act that dictated the current approach to improving air
quality were enacted, those firms that invested in emissions control equip-
ment (and thus incurred costs that are now sunk) during the period from
1972 to 1979 did so unaware of the potential of bubbles. The amount of
investment by firms in pre-bubble technology helps to explain why firms
are not currently taking advantage of bubbles as widely as might be
expected.
150. The rationale for this system is that because existing sources will eventually be replaced by
new ones, there will be a gradual increase in emission reductions because new sources must use the
most effective emissions controls. However, the bias against new sources also provides an incentive for
firms to maintain their existing plant and equipment for a longer period than they otherwise might
have.
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B. Uncertainty Concerning Property Rights
Uncertainty about property rights was mentioned earlier as one factor
causing a lack of banking activity. 1 ' Banking rules are often ambiguous
about how rights in emission credits can be established and used, thereby
creating uncertainty that reduces a firm's incentive to use emission
banks.'"2 Similar uncertainties about property rights have made internal
trading a more attractive alternative than it might otherwise be. As previ-
ously described, firms face considerable uncertainty in anticipating how
regulators will determine their baseline emission levels and emission
reductions for emissions trading purposes. In making an external trade,
firms face the even greater uncertainty associated with calculating these
factors for another firm." If credits are to be obtained by external trad-
ing, firms must know whether the potential seller is really going to be able
to make the emission reductions necessary to create the credits. If so, the
firm must know whether regulators will officially recognize the creation of
the credits and the right of the seller to transfer them to the buyer."5
Firms cannot answer these questions with as much confidence as they can
when making internal trades.' 55 Because firms value certainty when con-
sidering major investments, they are likely to find internal trading advan-
tageous, even if emission credits might be acquired at a lower cost through
an external trade.
C. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs also play a major role in a firm's decision about
whether to use emissions trading and whether to trade internally or exter-
nally. As shown above, uncertainty about property rights causes firms to
choose internal trading over external. Transaction costs associated with an
external trade also stem from the search for sellers of emission credits.'
56
Without banking programs to provide an efficient means for firms to iden-
tify holders of emission credits, the task of finding willing sellers of credits
can be formidable.'57 Furthermore, a firm searching for credits has no
151. See supra note 119-21 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (discussion of effect of uncertainty on
calculations).
154. Uncertainty about official recognition of emissions reductions is exacerbated by the poor
quality of information in state emission inventories. See supra notes 17 & 44.
155. The exception to this occurs when a potential seller has already banked credits. However,
only a small number of firms have banked credits. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
156. The perspective of buyers of credits is adopted here because firms buying credits make deci-
sions about whether to use internal or external trading. Sellers of credits also face search costs and
may have the option to use their credits internally.
157. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 52.
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market information from which it can anticipate the future price of cred-
its.' 58 If a firm has the option of generating credits internally, it may
choose to do so rather than incur the expense of a search for credits when
the outcome of the search is unpredictable. The dominance of internal
trading indicates that many firms have made this choice.
Transaction costs are also incurred in obtaining regulatory approval for
an emissions trade. The federal-approval process for bubbles is much
more costly and lengthy than for many state-approved emissions trading
activities,' 59 thereby creating a great incentive for firms to use forms of
emissions trading under state control-generic bubbles, netting, and
offsets.' 60
V. Understanding the Political Environment
The controversy surrounding emissions trading has led to a variety of
proposals for modifying the program.' 6 ' To evaluate specific reform pro-
posals, it is necessary to understand not only the legislative and regulatory
foundations of emissions trading, but also the political environment that
has given rise to the current emissions trading program. The political
environment is just as important in determining the scope and success of
potential reforms of emissions trading as are the constraints imposed by
the Clean Air Act.
The evolution of the emissions trading program can best be understood
as a continuing struggle over the nature and distribution of property
rights. The three key groups involved are environmentalists, industry, and
regulators."' They focus not only on measurable outputs, such as costs
158. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussion of state and federal bubble ap-
proval processes).
160. Two other factors that place firms using federal bubbles at a disadvantage relative to users of
state-controlled emissions trading activities are the high degree of scrutiny given by opponents of
emissions trading to federally-controlled activities and the greater willingness of many state regulators
to accommodate the needs of firms.
161. See infra notes 171-93 and accompanying text (general discussion of reform proposals).
162. The interest group analysis presented here is an application of an approach frequently
employed by political economists. See, e.g., M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
For a general assessment of the interest group paradigm and the importance of the legislature in
explaining patterns in environmental regulation, see R. HAHN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL REGULATION: TOWARDS A UNIFYING FRAMEWORK (Working paper No. 88-33, Car-
negie Mellon Univ., School of Urban and Public Affairs, 1988). For other accounts of the involvement
of interest groups in the evolution of emissions trading, see B. COOK, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND
REGULATORY REFORM (1988); R. LIROFF, supra note 23; B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN
COAL, DIRTY AIR (1981); L. Rirs, SUMMARY OF COMMENTS: EMISSIONS TRADING POLICY
STATEMENT AND TECHNICAL ISSUES DOCUMENT (ELI Working Paper, 1982); Levin, supra note
21; Meidinger, On Explaining the Development of "Emissions Trading" in U.S. Air Pollution Reg-
ulation, 7 LAW & POL'y 447 (1985).
This taxonomy is a convenient simplification. Obviously different industries will have different
agendas, as will different environmental groups. Nonetheless, this taxonomy is useful for exploring
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and environmental quality, but also on underlying values. While not at-
tempting to capture every aspect of this conflict, this Part provides a para-
digm that explains how the emissions trading program developed.
A. Environmentalists' Concerns
Environmentalists have consistently questioned the merits of emissions
trading, arguing that environmental quality objectives have been sacrificed
for economic efficiency. However, there is another, deeper sense in which
environmentalists oppose this reform. A fundamental premise of emissions
trading is that explicit trading of emission rights is legitimate. Many
environmentalists reject this premise, regardless of the anticipated effect of
emissions trading on environmental quality. For some, it is an issue of
morality: clean air is a basic inalienable right that is not for sale at any
price. Even for those who do not take this absolute moral position, there is
a symbolic issue. Allowing firms to trade emission rights sends a message
that decisions about tradeoffs between economics and environmental qual-
ity can be left to the polluters. In addition to its immediate effects, this
message may in the long term shape national attitudes in ways that are
antithetical to environmentalists' views. For these reasons, environmental-
ists have been almost unanimous in their opposition to emissions
trading.""3
B. Industry's Goals
Industry's response to emissions trading has been more diverse because
of conflicting motivations underlying industry behavior. It is generally
assumed that firms wish to reduce their expenditures on environmental
controls. Less widely recognized is the fact that industry has a strong pref-
erence for greater certainty in environmental regulation. Thus, the poten-
tial cost reduction that can be achieved under emissions trading policies
may not be worth the uncertainty that is created by participation. This
view is confirmed by the fact that firms generally have not used bubbles
except when they face compliance deadlines." 4 When they have the op-
tion, firms tend to comply with limits contained in existing permits, which
involves little or no uncertainty.
many of the features of environmental regulation and, in particular, emissions trading.
163. Environmentalists are becoming more receptive to incentive-based approaches, especially in
cases when the polluter must pay the state for the right to pollute. A case in point is the possible
auctioning of permits for controlling the production and use of chlorofluorcarbons. R. HAHN & A.
MCGARTLAND, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTRUMENT CHOICE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
U.S. ROLE IN IMPLEMENTINc THE MONTREAL PROTOCAL (Working Paper No. 88-34, Carnegie
Mellon Univ., School of Urban and Public Affairs, 1988) (forthcoming Nw. U.L REV.).
164. See supra note 89.
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C. Regulators' Dilemma
The countervailing pressures of industry and environmentalists are
brought to bear on a third key interest group-regulators. Regulators
attempt to implement laws and to develop regulations in ways that mini-
mize conflict among interest groups. With emissions trading, regulators
have attempted to provide industry with increased flexibility while offer-
ing environmentalists improved air quality. Meeting these two objectives
has required a careful balancing act. To provide industry with flexibility,
regulators have defined a set of property rights and placed minimum
restrictions on their use. At the same time, they have been sensitive to the
concerns of environmentalists regarding the definition of these rights.
Thus, they have created policies specifically designed to de-emphasize the
nature of the property right. For example, instead of being explicitly
called "tradable emission permits," regulators use names such as "emis-
sion reduction credits" and "offsets." '65 Neither of these terms clearly
conveys the notion that rights to emit pollutants are being exchanged.
The problem in defining property rights goes beyond developing accept-
able names. One of the continuing difficulties encountered in emissions
trading is determining what entitlements accompany the right. Regulators
are reluctant to define property rights in a way that resolves the uncer-
tainty concerning their use in external trades due to potential criticisms
from environmentalists. Moreover, they tend to give these rights an infer-
ior status for the same reason. For example, banked emission credits are
sometimes subject to a "discount", a de facto partial confiscation, while
informally banked rights are not.166 As noted in the previous section,
banking has had only a small impact on actual trading. Yet its use has
been quite controversial. This controversy has a number of causes; one
that certainly affected banking is the belief of environmentalists that the
very activity of banking lends legitimacy to the trading of rights. Informal
banks enable state regulators to afford firms flexibility while avoiding the
criticism of environmentalists.
Arguably, the most important tangible concern of environmentalists
regarding emissions trading is the effect it has, and will have, on environ-
mental quality. Federal regulators attempted to address this concern by
designing a system in which trades are approved only if they can be
shown to have a benign impact on environmental quality.""7 When EPA
165. Air Quality. Standards, Interpretive Ruling, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 51) (discussing offsets); Emissions Trading Policy Statement, General Principles for Crea-
tion, Banking, and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, Proposed Policy, 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076 (1982)
(discussing ERCs).
166. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
167. Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,814-60 (1986).
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released its "Final Emissions Trading Policy" in 1986, the Agency issued
explicit guidelines and required a high degree of central oversight on poli-
cies within its direct jurisdiction-most notably the bubble policy.""
Whether firms and/or regulators have adhered to these guidelines is
debatable, but federal regulators clearly have taken great care in address-
ing this issue. 69
This paradigm of interest group interaction explains much about the
development and performance of emissions trading to date. In particular,
it helps explain two features affecting the performance of the program
previously identified: uncertainties associated with property rights and
high transaction costs due to a lack of an efficient credit market. The
uncertainty surrounding the existence of tangible property rights is largely
due to conflicts over the definition of those rights. Transaction costs exist,
in part, because of the requirements imposed on trading by regulators to
assure environmentalists that a trade will be approved only if it has no
adverse effect on environmental quality. 7
Regulators at both the state and federal levels will continue to respond
to pressure from environmentalists and industry as emissions trading con-
tinues to evolve. These interactions constrain the scope for change in emis-
sions trading and must be taken into account. Proposals for reform that
ignore these constraints run the risk of being irrelevant for policy makers.
VI. Evaluating Proposals For Reform
In evaluating reform proposals, it is important to select criteria that
provide useful summary information on the state of the existing system
and proposed alternatives. The analysis presented below utilizes emissions
control costs'' and environmental quality. 7" The existing regulatory sys-
168. Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,814-60 (1986).
169. See, e.g., Air Pollution Control, Recommendations for Alternative Emission Reduction
Options within State Implementation Plans, 44 Fed. Reg. 3740, 3740-43 (1979) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 52).
170. The third feature, that of the difference in regulatory treatment of new and old sources, can
also be traced to the struggle between environmentalists and industry. A detailed explanation of this
feature is beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly, however, regulators (and Congress) have responded
to the most pressing concern of industry by assuring that existing emission sources would be subject to
the least stringent emission control requirements. They addressed environmentalists' desire for
improved air quality by imposing the most stringent control requirements on sources that will be
created in the future. Their rationale was the belief that new sources would replace existing sources
over time until all remaining sources are stringently controlled. For an incisive analysis of the politics
motivating new source performance standards, see B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 162.
171. In addition to the direct costs of emissions control, this analysis considers factors such as
uncertainty and cumbersome administrative procedures that add to the cost of using emissions trading.
172. While we believe other criteria are important, such as the effect reforms have on process,
values, and ease of administration, this type of analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. Further-
more, control costs and environmental quality correspond closely to the primary concerns of industry
and environmentalists, respectively.
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tern is used as a benchmark for evaluating each proposal's relative
impacts.
There is an implicit tradeoff between the goals of reducing costs and
improving environmental quality, although it is possible to promote both
goals simultaneously. Increasing a firm's flexibility is not the only way to
reduce costs, nor is tightening standards on every trade the only way to
improve environmental quality. However, at some point, these goals inevi-
tably will conflict. In designing a system where the actual effects of regu-
latory programs are uncertain and information about the various program
elements is limited, this tradeoff should be viewed in probabilistic
terms. 73 Stated differently, the primary emphasis should be on the likely
characteristics of typical emissions trading transactions rather than focus
on extreme outcomes, whether good or bad, that could result.
Every proposed emissions trading system affects both costs and environ-
mental quality. Industry usually advocates reforms aimed primarily at
decreasing the costs of pollution control. These proposals generally involve
expanding the scope for emissions trading by increasing the options avail-
able to firms for meeting environmental objectives. However, when effi-
ciency gains result from giving firms greater flexibility in determining
how to control their emissions, environmental quality may be adversely
affected." 4 In order to reduce emissions control costs without any sacrifice
of environmental quality, some increase in regulatory expenditures may
be required.
Environmentalists generally advocate reforms aimed primarily at
improving environmental quality. Such proposals typically restrict the
scope of emissions trading by decreasing a firm's flexibility. They often
call for greater regulatory involvement in emissions trading while paying
little attention to the potential for increased administrative and emissions
control costs. Moreover, a focus on individual firms' emissions tends to
obscure the global objectives of meeting ambient standards in a timely
manner.
173. Suppose, for example, that the effects of a policy are measured in terms of their impact on
costs and environmental quality. When measured in this way, one can then characterize the impact of
this policy in terms of a probability distribution over costs and environmental quality.
174. Increased flexibility enables firms to use their knowledge about emissions control cost func-
tions to find lower cost technologies for controlling emissions. An alternative is for regulators to
increase their knowledge about firms' control cost functions and to design regulations in such a way
that cost-effectiveness in emissions control will be increased. Aside from the fact that it is costly to
obtain this information, efforts to obtain such information and use it to design cost-effective regula-
tions have not been notably successful in the past. For a discussion of alternative approaches to ob-
taining more accurate cost information from firms, see Sonstelie & Portney, Truth or Consequences:
Cost Revelation and Regulation, 2 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 280, 280-84 (1982).
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A. EPA's Final Emissions Trading Policy
The most significant elements of EPA's Final Emissions Trading Policy
are:
1. Setting baselines for bubble transactions in nonattainment areas at
the lower of allowable or actual emissions.'"
2. Setting baselines in attainment areas at allowable emission levels,
unless their use would threaten maintenance of air quality, in which case
the baseline will be the lower of allowable or actual emissions.' 6
3. Revising the trading rule for bubbles in nonattainment areas so that
an additional twenty percent reduction in emissions remaining after the
transaction will be required from all trading sources. This applies to both
internal and external trades.'
4. Allowing generic bubble rules in nonattainment areas provided that
they produce additional reductions in emissions consistent with reaching
attainment in the future.
17 8
5. Increasing EPA oversight of state review of bubble applications
under generic rules.'
79
6. Expediting review of pending bubble applications. 80
This reform proposal substantially tightens the previous requirements
for emissions trading, especially as they apply to nonattainment areas. By
clarifying baselines for these areas, it reduces some of the uncertainty
about the property rights to which firms may be entitled. However, the
requirement that all sources involved in a bubble transaction in nonat-
tainment areas reduce their remaining emissions by twenty percent
imposes a substantial burden on firms and will cause a decline in bubble
activity in nonattainment areas. 8 ' Advantageous use of a bubble under
this provision will require a much wider difference in control costs
175. Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,816, 43,818-20, 43,839-40 (1986).
176. Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,816-18, 43,838-39 (1986). This element of
EPA's Final Trading Policy has been significantly simplified for the convenience of readers who are
unfamiliar with the intricacies of the Clean Air Act. This simplification parallels the distinctions
made between areas by EPA in its Final Policy Statement. The "nonattainment areas" referred to in
this section are only those areas for which state regulators have been unable either to meet air quality
standards or to demonstrate to EPA's satisfaction that they have implementation plans in place which
will enable them to meet air quality standards in the near future. "Attainment areas," in this section
only, include (in addition to areas in compliance with air quality standards) areas not currently in
compliance with standards, but where EPA-approved implementation plans will lead to attainment in
the near future.
177. Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,820-21, 43,839 (1986).
178. Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,823-24, 43,850-54 (1986).
179. Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,824, 43,853-54 (1986).
180. Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,815, 43,831, 43,840 (1986).
18.1. This prediction of decreased trading activity also applies to generic bubbles and banking
activity in these areas because these activities are subject to a similar reduction requirement. Final
Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,815, 43,831, 43,840 (1986).
Vol. 6: 109, 1989
Emissions Trading
between the sources trading than under previous provisions because the
required reduction in emissions for any trade will be at least twenty per-
cent greater than under the previous bubble policy. The larger the sources
involved, the larger will be the absolute amount of the twenty percent
additional reduction required. Large sources are currently the primary
users of bubbles because their cost savings justify going through the
lengthy and expensive bubble process.18
Allowing the use of generic bubble rules in nonattainment areas is a
positive step. Most bubble activity appears to take place in these areas,
and generic rules result in more bubble activity than do rules requiring
EPA approval. However, the fact that EPA intends to play a greater role
in reviewing bubbles under generic rules works in the opposite direction,
and could mean that approval for generic bubbles will be more difficult
and time consuming. Thus, how EPA regions implement this element of
the reform proposal will be crucial in determining whether generic bubble
activity increases or decreases.
In attainment areas, the use of allowable emissions as a baseline for
calculating emission credits will clarify uncertainty about a firm's prop-
erty rights. Yet, most of the firms in these areas are presumably already in
compliance or have already determined how to comply in the near future.
Bubble activity in these areas is already at a low level,183 and in the
absence of pending compliance deadlines or additional actions to en-
courage emissions trading, we predict that it is likely to remain so.
A major problem with the new EPA policy is that it reinforces the
perception of a strong link between emissions trading and the achievement
of air quality standards. This is especially apparent in the requirement
for additional reductions for emissions trading in nonattainment areas.
This requirement is at odds with the statement contained in the preamble
to the policy that "[b]ubbles are simply alternative means of complying
[with emission limits] at less cost. They should be treated neither more
nor less stringently than other, more traditional methods of compli-
ance."' 84 Requiring large additional emission reductions from firms using
emissions trading simply creates another disincentive for firms to use
trading."'
182. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see R. HAHN, RULES, EQUALITY AND EFFI-
CIENCY: AN EVALUATION OF Two REGULATORY REFORMS (Working Paper No. 87-7, Carnegie
Mellon Univ., School of Urban and Public Affairs, 1987).
183. See supra note 80.
184. Final Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,829 (1986).
185. Requiring marginally higher reductions is not necessarily a bad idea, however, since this
may be a way to shift the probability distribution of the environmental effects of emissions trading
toward the positive side without creating excessive incentives against the use of trading. One example
is the use of offset rules that require offsets to equal the amount of a new source's emissions plus some
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There are two unquestionably positive aspects of this policy from the
viewpoint of encouraging emissions trading. The first is the directive that
pending bubble applications be processed promptly, which may eliminate
a substantial backlog of applications that have been languishing at various
points in the EPA-review process for many months. If some of these ap-
plications are approved, other firms may be encouraged to apply, although
the fact that compliance deadlines for most pollutants have passed may
mean that most firms will have little incentive to use bubbles in the fore-
seeable future.186 The second positive aspect of this reform proposal is the
statement that this policy "provides a permanent framework that will
guide development of future bubbles and should make environmentally
sound emissions trades more predictable and easy to obtain. 1 87 If this
proves to be the case, much of the uncertainty about emissions trading
that has resulted from frequent regulatory shifts will be eliminated. It
cannot, however, resolve uncertainty due to promised court challenges by
environmentalists.1 88
Overall, EPA's Final Emissions Trading Policy represents a conserva-
tive, cautious approach to the reform of emissions trading. Its emphasis is
on preventing problem transactions rather than on increasing the level of
trading. In areas experiencing difficulty complying with air quality stan-
dards, emissions trading is used to reduce emissions (through the use of
the twenty percent additional reduction rule) rather than as a means to
reduce emissions control costs. The new policy will reduce the probability
of adverse environmental quality impacts from emissions trading. How-
ever, it will do so at the cost of reducing the level of trading and the
economic gains from trading associated with federally-reviewed bubbles.
In balancing the interests of environmentalists and industry, this reform
small percentage. For a discussion of existing approaches to this problem in the context of offsets, see
R. HAHN, supra note 182, at 6-9.
186. As of January 1988, although processing of applications has resumed, no more bubbles had
been approved under the new policy. Telephone interview with Barry Elman, Staff Member, EPA
Regulatory Reform Staff (Jan. 1988).
187. Envtl. Protection Agency, Press Release No. R-153 (Nov. 19, 1986).
188. "This policy is really not the end of anything. It's almost irrelevant, because when EPA
starts processing bubbles again, it's going to get test cases [in court], and we're going to win [those
suits]. . .We tried to persuade [EPA Administrator] Thomas to do the right thing." Stanfield, The
Elusive Bubble, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1986, at 822 (first two alterations in original) (quoting David
Doniger, Senior Staff Attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council) (referring to then-
forthcoming Final Emissions Trading Policy). In addition to the Final Emissions Trading Policy,
EPA issued a clarification of its policy on netting. This clarification should reduce uncertainty about
when and how firms can use netting, and thus increase the likelihood that firms will use netting in the
future. Memorandum from J. Craig Potter, EPA Assistant Administrator for Air And Radiation, to
EPA Regional Directors (Feb. 27, 1987) (plantwide definition of major stationary sources of air pol-
lution) (on file with authors).
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seems to give considerably greater weight to the concerns of
environmentalists.
B. An Alternative Approach to Emissions Trading Reform
One alternative reform that would reduce costs while promoting envi-
ronmental quality is to reduce some of the uncertainties for firms engag-
ing in emissions trading while, at the same time, improving the informa-
tion necessary to calculate the baselines from which emission credits are
determined. For example, improvements in data on actual emissions could
simultaneously reduce some of the uncertainty for firms about their poten-
tial to create emission credits and decrease the probability that firms could
use paper credits in emissions trading transactions. This type of reform
might be seen as desirable by both industry and environmentalists for it
would yield significant cost savings while maintaining environmental
quality.189 Cost savings can be encouraged by increasing flexibility in
meeting specific emissions standards, reducing uncertainties over the defi-
nition of property rights, and decreasing certain types of federal oversight
to reduce transaction costs. Elements of this alternative proposal include:
1. Improving emission inventories so that allowable emissions could be
used as the baseline for all emissions trading.
2. Enlarging significantly the scope of trading for new and modified
sources. Firms would be allowed to use internal or external trading to
meet all emission limits, and trades would be permitted only if they could
be shown to result in no net emission increases beyond those allowed
under current policy.1 90
3. Encouraging states to develop generic bubble rules, and expediting
approval of those rules at the federal level.
4. Developing a model banking program at the federal level, encourag-
ing states to adopt it, and designing banking regulations that would
encourage external trading. The regulations would require that all emis-
sion reductions being saved for future use by firms be deposited in formal
189. The presentation of this reform proposal should not be construed as an endorsement. Rather,
it is an example of how the design of a proposal is contingent on its intended objectives. For a propo-
sal for reforming emissions trading that takes the middle ground between EPA's and the one
presented here, see R. LIROFF, supra note 23, at 135-44.
190. Note that the Clean Air Act does not allow new sources to avoid the "technology forcing
standards" that apply to them. Despite the apparent inconsistency of this element with this provision
of the statute, we feel that it is consistent with the overall goals of the Clean Air Act because the
emission limits for new sources would be retained. This proposal would simply provide firms with
flexibility in deciding how to meet those limits. A more detailed proposal would have to consider the
anticipated useful lives of sources creating emission credits in order to preserve momentum toward
improving air quality.
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banks. In addition, the regulations would give banked emission rights the
same status as rights that are currently in use.
The proposal to remedy information deficiencies for calculating emis-
sion credits would eliminate a major source of uncertainty about the
probability of getting specific emissions trades approved. 91 This would
reduce a firm's incentives to trade internally. Improving emission invento-
ries will require a massive effort by states, but the information gained
would be of great value to regulators for meeting air quality goals
regardless of whether emissions trading was used. Expanding the scope of
emissions trading for new and modified sources would make emissions
control requirements more neutral with regard to a firm's decision
whether to construct a new industrial facility. 9 '
Shifting primary control for bubble approval to the state level would
reduce the time required to process applications and therefore reduce the
uncertainty and transaction costs for firms. Developing a model banking
program at the federal level would encourage the establishment of active,
formal emission banks. These banks would significantly reduce transac-
tion costs for emissions trading, especially search costs for firms that could
benefit from external trades. Because only formally banked credits could
be saved, informal banking would be effectively eliminated. The
advantage of formal banks is that unlike informal banks, they function as
a public source of information on credit availability. Granting banked
rights equal status to rights currently in use would protect emission cred-
its from confiscation, and would thus encourage greater firm participation
in banking programs. 93
While this proposal is structured primarily for the purpose of increas-
ing cost savings from emissions trading, it is not intended to do so at the
expense of environmental quality. More accurate emission inventories
would surely be welcomed by environmentalists. The remaining elements
of the proposal are intended, at a minimum, to maintain current levels of
environmental quality. This proposal would not prevent regulators from
requiring further emission reductions if environmental quality goals were
not met. In fact, if active markets in emission credits were established,
191. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (discussion of impact of uncertainty about
baseline emissions quantities on emissions trading). 1
192. A distinction between new and existing sources would remain for firms engaged in netting
because netting can result in small net increases in the level of emissions and external trading is not
permitted. If external trading were allowed for netting, almost all firms wishing to build new or
modified sources would use netting, since this would require that they purchase fewer emission cred-
its. While this would result in higher cost savings for firms, environmental quality would be adversely
affected. The proposal described here does not allow external trading for netting for this reason.
193. If reduction of all emission limits were necessary in an area, such a reduction should also
affect banked credits. The proposal presented in this Article extends to banked rights the same treat-
ment afforded rights already in use; it does not give banked rights preferential treatment.
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regulators could reduce all permitted emission levels gradually over time,
letting market forces determine where specific reductions should be made.
If a proposal like the one presented above cannot be adopted, a worthy
alternative is to conduct a carefully monitored demonstration project. Such
a project could be implemented on a small scale by a state regulatory
agency. If these reforms are effective in limited geographic regions, they
might change the attitudes of environmentalists and state regulators, most
of whom have been reluctant to adopt emissions trading provisions. Only
with support at the state level, where emissions trading can be effectively
implemented or undermined, can the opportunity exist for improving
emissions trading.
The foregoing analysis suggests the following three conclusions. First,
the appropriate path for reform cannot be identified without specifying
design objectives. Unfortunately, these objectives are frequently not stated,
or not stated very clearly, in existing proposals. Second, it is possible to
design reform proposals consistent with the Clean Air Act that both pro-
mote environmental quality and reduce expenditures on pollution control
activities. Third, and perhaps most important, the nature of the political
process is likely to shape and severely constrain the nature of reform
proposals.
Conclusion
The emissions trading program has yielded a mixed bag of successes
and failures. The activity given the most attention-EPA-approved
bubbles-has been the least used. Nevertheless, the cost savings from
emissions trading have been impressive, amounting to over a billion dol-
lars. Netting and offsets have been the most successful aspects of the pro-
gram, having been used by thousands of firms. Banking has been the least
used emissions trading activity. As a result, potential buyers and sellers
have not been brought together. In fact, the general failure of active mar-
kets in emission reduction credits to develop is the greatest disappointment
of emissions trading. Until such markets exist, the full potential of emis-
sions trading to reduce pollution control costs will go unrealized.
The aggregate environmental effects of emissions trading appear to
have been negligible, although further information is necessary to deter-
mine the precise effects of netting and offsets on the environment. A criti-
cal factor in assessing environmental performance is the baseline used for
determining permissible trades. If the baseline involves a large amount of
permitted emissions that are not actually produced, then the potential for
an adverse environmental impact is significant; if the baseline reflects a
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realistic assessment of actual emissions, then the potential for environmen-
tal harm is slight.
Thus, the results of our analysis show that the emissions trading policy
is worthwhile. A reform was implemented that resulted in significant cost
savings without adversely affecting aggregate environmental quality.
Given this outcome, it is important to consider why the program has been
so controversial. The answer emerges only after dissecting the interests of
the various groups that shaped the program.
Environmentalists and industry both have strong interests in achieving
their respective policy goals and regulators try to balance what are often
competing interests. The interaction of these three groups has given rise to
the current emissions trading policy. The basic controversy over emissions
trading can be understood in terms of a struggle over property rights.
Environmentalists and industry fundamentally disagree on who is entitled
to benefit from the property rights created by emissions trading and how
these rights can be used. Because of this disagreement, EPA has tried to
structure its policies in such a way as to reduce conflicts between these
interest groups. This observation explains much about the evolution of the
program because it accounts for the language developed by EPA that
attempts to minimize the appearance that industry had been given a nego-
tiable property right. The resulting uncertainty about the status of emis-
sion reduction credits has led industry to use internal rather than external
trades.
While a discussion about property rights is instructive, it fails to
account for another interesting feature of emissions trading. The perform-
ance of each of the emissions trading programs, when measured by its
activity levels, exhibits dramatic differences. At least part of this variation
is attributable to the differing levels of federal involvement. Other things
being equal, state regulators will prefer to implement programs over
which they have greater control. This straightforward observation accu-
rately explains the relative performance of different elements of emissions
trading. Moreover, it explains some of the innovations made by state reg-
ulators, such as informal banking.
The fact that state-controlled emissions trading programs have been
more active does not imply that federal involvement in emissions trading
or increased federal oversight is unwarranted. Rather, it emphasizes the
importance of examining the relationship between federal, state, and local
authorities in understanding emissions trading activities. Indeed, inter-
governmental relations can explain a wide array of environmental policies,
ranging from monitoring and enforcement to standard-setting. Further
research in this area will probably be useful in constructing a theory that
accounts for differences in implementation.
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The experience in emissions trading sheds light on the capacity of gov-
ernment to design more flexible approaches to environmental regulation.
The performance of this program reveals that reform is likely to follow a
tortuous path when interest groups pursue divergent policies. However,
all efforts to implement more flexible approaches for addressing environ-
mental problems need not be tangled in red tape. Such programs are less
likely to get bogged down when there is a greater consensus about the
nature and goals of the program. Indeed, EPA's program to promote lead
trading among gasoline refiners provides an interesting contrast to the
emissions trading program. Unlike emissions trading, the lead trading
program appears to have created a smoothly functioning market for lead
rights.1 4
A final lesson to be drawn from the preceding analysis is that a study of
only part of a program can be misleading. Focusing on the entire array of
emissions trading activities not only sheds light on the overall performance
of the program, but also leads to the development of a paradigm that is
useful in understanding the choice and implementation of regulatory
instruments. Currently, no theory of instrument choice that includes im-
plementation issues is widely accepted.19 Such a theory can be built in-
ductively through careful analysis of the political economy of regulatory
reform.
194. For a comparison of the emissions trading and lead trading programs, see Hahn & Hester,
Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming).
195. See, e.g., Wolf, A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis,
22 J.L. & ECON. 107 (1979).

